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I. INTRODUCTION
A long standing feature of U.S. corporate taxation is a group of
doctrinal devices serving to prevent taxpayer attempts to avoid double
taxation of corporate earnings. This Article refers to these devices
collectively as the constructive dividend doctrine (hereinafter “CDD”)
and analyzes the extent to which the CDD ought to be set aside as
counterproductive.
This analysis is grounded in contrasting views of the normative tax
treatment of corporate enterprise. On the one hand is the perspective in
which the double income taxation of corporate income is normative (the
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“Double Tax Perspective”). The Double Tax Perspective calls for
taxation of corporate income1 a first time as it is received or accrued in
the corporation’s hands and a second time as those corporate earnings
are distributed to shareholders. The normative shareholder treatment
from the Double Tax Perspective is as full ordinary income in
shareholders’ hands as corporate earnings are distributed. It treats the
reduced rate capital gain taxation for most stock sales2 and deemed stock
sales3 as a “narrow” exception to this norm.
A contrasting perspective is one in which all income derived from a
business enterprise would be taxed exactly once (the “Integrationist
Norm”). Under such an idealized Integrationist Norm, all income would
be imputed to individuals connected with the corporate enterprise—as
shareholders or otherwise—as earned, and all income would be taxed at
the individual rate schedules. In principle, the nearest one might come
to such a perfect regime is the fiscal transparency of a full pass-through
regime. Under such a tax regime, there would be no corporate-level tax.
Instead, all of the revenue of the corporation would be taxed as income
of some individual. The nearest analog is the tax treatment of
partnerships.4
This Article is predicated on the wisdom of the Integraionist Norm.
Elsewhere, in an article entitled Advancing to Corporate Tax
Integration: A Laissez-Faire Approach,5 I advanced the proposition
that, although systematic corporate tax integration is unlikely to be
enacted in the foreseeable future, integrationism should be regarded as
normative. The Laissez-Faire Approach proposes that, to the extent that
legal mechanisms serve to prevent self-help corporate tax integration,
1. The term “corporate income” is associated with equity’s residual claim on corporate
receipts net of the claims of all “expenses,” i.e., the claims of all other participants in the corporate
enterprise. See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Corporate Interest Deduction: A Policy Evaluation, 83
YALE L.J. 1585, 1587 (1974). Yet it almost goes without saying that a corporation, as such, cannot
have income in any economically meaningful sense. If taxation of “corporate income” has any
justification, it is as a stand-in for the achievement of some implicit policy goal that cannot be
otherwise addressed directly. See Anthony P. Polito, Useful Fictions: Debt and Equity
Classification in Corporate Tax Law, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 761, 766-70 (1998).
2. I.R.C. § 1221 (2006) (defining capital asset).
3. See id. §§ 302, 303, 304, 331, 356.
4. See id. §§ 701-777, 6221-6234. In practice, fiscal transparency cannot be effected in a
manner that fully eliminates all distinctions between a business conducted directly as an individual’s
sole proprietorship and an enterprise conducted through a legal structure. See LAURA E.
CUNNINGHAM & NOEL B. CUNNINGHAM, THE LOGIC OF SUBCHAPTER K (3d ed. 2006).
Nevertheless, the partnership paradigm appears to be the nearest alternative possible to the
integrationist ideal.
5. Anthony P. Polito, Advancing to Corporate Tax Integration: A Laissez-Faire Approach,
55 S.C. L. REV. 1 (2003).
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they are counterproductive, wasting valuable taxpayer, IRS, and judicial
resources. This Article analyzes the CDD in light of the Laissez-Faire
Approach in order to identify circumstances in which it is best to
dispense with the CDD as a counterproductive mechanism that wastes
resources reinforcing the double tax anti-ideal.
II. CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS IN A DOUBLE TAX WORLD
From the Double Tax Perspective, the CDD plays a vital role of
policing for transactions that seek to evade full double taxation. In the
world of the Double Tax Perspective, a corporate distribution to
shareholders, qua shareholders, out of corporate earnings should be
taxed at full ordinary tax rates, even to the extent it represents amounts
of earnings already reduced by a corporate tax.6 In addition, accurate
measurement of an individual’s income requires that payments and
property transfers made on behalf of an individual or for the benefit of
an individual should be treated the same as if they were made directly to
the individual and further transferred by that person.7 By that logic,
corporate transfers that benefit shareholders in the same manner as
dividends need to be classified as such, hence the perceived need for the
CDD.
An economic perspective, however, makes this issue somewhat
more complicated. Under idealized economic conditions, no dividend
distribution—actual or constructive—increases the wealth of
shareholders. It simply changes the form of wealth holding. A portion
of the wealth represented by corporate shares is separated from the
underlying shares.8 Under the less than idealized conditions of actual
markets, dividend distributions and dividend policy do have actual
effects on shareholder value.9 Tax policy, however, has never attempted
6. See I.R.C. § 301 (2006). But see I.R.C. §§ 302, 303, 304, 331, 356 (allowing sale
treatment and capital gain rates in specified circumstances).
7. See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
[W]e think the question presented is whether a taxpayer, having induced a third person to
pay his income tax or having acquiesced in such payment as made in discharge of an
obligation to him, may avoid the making of a return thereof and the payment of a
corresponding tax. We think he may not do so. . . . The discharge by a third person of
an obligation to him is equivalent to receipt by the person taxed.
Id. at 729.
8. Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of
Shares, 34 J. BUS. 411, 413-14 (1961). See also RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS &
FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 397-402 (10th ed. 2011) (hereinafter
“Brealey, Myers & Allen”).
9. See Brealey, Myers & Allen, supra note 8, at 402-10. See also Polito, supra note 5, at 1014.
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to separately measure and tax the increment to shareholder wealth
generated by dividend payout policy, regardless of whether practicable
measurement of that increment could ever be possible. Instead, the tax
is based on the amount of earnings separated from the corporation as an
entity. An actual dividend is treated as a realization event, which, just
like any other arm’s length realization, does not generate wealth but
changes its form.10 In the double tax system, the taxation of dividends is
not a tax on a new accretion of wealth; it is a second tax on an accretion
previously taxed via the taxation of the corporation.
At the same time, every corporate transaction that increases the
value of a solvent corporation benefits shareholders by making their
shares more valuable. However, these transactions are not treated as
constructive dividends because the existing policy is the taxation of the
separation of earnings from the corporation.11 Because there is no policy
for the tax on dividends to become a tax on share value appreciation,
constructive dividends must not include corporate transactions that
benefit shareholders solely by means of making their shares more
valuable.12 A constructive dividend is a corporate transaction that has
the same effect of separating wealth from the corporate entity and
placing it in the shareholders’ separate ownership and control.13
This economic perspective explains the existing state of the CDD.
An illuminating explanation is that a corporate transfer is a constructive
dividend if: (1) the primary purpose of the transfer is to benefit
shareholders rather than for a valid business purpose pertaining to the
corporation as an entity distinct from its shareholders; and (2) the
transfer causes property to leave the control of the transferring
corporation and to be subject to direct or indirect control by
shareholders.14 This form of the CDD backstops the double taxation of
corporate earnings but only as those earnings depart corporate solution
into the hands of shareholders.

10. See Anthony P. Polito, Borrowing, Return of Capital Conventions, and the Structure of
the Income Tax: An Essay in Statutory Interpretation, 17 VA. TAX REV. 467, 492-96 (1998).
11. See, e.g., Robert C. Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory
Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90, 100-04 (1977).
12. See, e.g., Sammons v. Comm’r, 472 F.2d 449, 451 (5th Cir. 1973); Citizens Bank & Trust
Co. v. United States, 580 F.2d 442 (Cl. Ct. 1978); Rapid Elec. Co. v. Comm’r, 61 T.C. 232 (1973),
acq., 1974-2 C.B. 1.
13. That a constructive dividend is deemed to be immediately reinvested in the corporation
does not prevent its taxation as a dividend. For example, cash dividends reinvested via a dividend
reinvestment plan are nonetheless fully taxable. See Rev. Rul. 78-375, 1978-2 C.B. 130; Rev. Rul.
77-149, 1977-1 C.B. 82; Rev. Rul. 76-53, 1976-1 C.B. 87.
14. See, e.g., Sammons, 472 F.2d at 451.
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III. AN INTEGRATIONIST PERSPECTIVE
From the perspective of the Integrationist Norm, however, this
backstopping of double taxation raises important concerns. Double
taxation is problematic because of the distortions to allocative efficiency
and distributive equity that it generates.15 Integrationism would exactly
eliminate the excess burden of double taxation and the economic and
distributive distortions that double taxation entails. Elsewhere, in an
article entitled Advancing to Corporate Tax Integration: A LaissezFaire Approach,16 I advanced the proposition that, although systematic
corporate tax integration is unlikely to be enacted in the foreseeable
future, integrationism should be regarded as normative. The LaissezFaire Approach proposes that, to the extent that legal mechanisms serve
to prevent self-help corporate tax integration, they are
counterproductive, wasting valuable taxpayer, IRS, and judicial
resources. Thus, as outlined in this Part III, the Laissez-Faire Approach
counsels dispensing with those mechanisms to the extent that they serve
solely to defend the double tax anti-ideal and are not considered
necessary to ensure that corporate income does not escape the normative
single level of taxation, and this analysis applies as much to the CDD as
to any other such mechanism.
A.

Systematic Tax Integration not a Practical Likelihood

In principle, the nearest one that might come to a perfectly
integrated regime is the fiscal transparency of a full pass-through
regime. Under such a tax regime, there would be no corporate-level tax.
Instead, all of the revenue of the corporation would be taxed as income
of some individual. The nearest analog is the tax treatment of
partnerships.17
As a practical matter, the full realization of the Integrationist Norm
is not practicable because of a number of serious issues related to
administrability. Any practical integration initiative would achieve less
than the full Integrationist Norm, and it would require the layering of
significant additional legal and administrative complexity on the existing

15. See Polito, supra note 5, at 6-29.
16. See Polito, supra note 5.
17. See I.R.C. §§ 701-777, 6221-6234 (2006). In practice, fiscal transparency cannot be
effected in a manner that fully eliminates all distinctions between a business conducted directly as
an individual’s sole proprietorship and an enterprise conducted through a legal structure. See
CUNNINGHAM & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 4. Nevertheless, the partnership paradigm appears to be
the nearest alternative possible to the integrationist ideal.
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tax regime.18 Moreover, the legislative and interest-group politics of tax
policy make it unlikely that Congress will enact systematic tax
integration.
Legislative action comprehensive enough to effect corporate tax
integration requires a concentrated and organized constituency that will
make its passage a priority. Corporate shareholders have an obvious
interest in advancing the integrationist agenda, but shareholders of
publicly-held corporations suffer in this context from the same collective
action problems that pose the well-known variety of corporate
governance issues arising in any Berle-Means corporation.19 They
would need, but for a variety of reasons lack, a well-organized ally to
lobby for comprehensive corporate tax integration.20
The George W. Bush Administration assembled legislative
majorities for two tax cutting acts21 that each reduced revenues by
hundreds of billions of dollars, but its proposal for nearly comprehensive
corporate integration22 was eclipsed by other tax cutting priorities.
Instead, the Bush Administration had to settle for partial relief from
double taxation in the form of taxing qualified dividends at reduced
capital-gain rates. Even that relief is scheduled to expire in 2013.23
Whether a further extension will be forthcoming is anyone’s guess. At
the same time, any comprehensive permanent scheme of corporate tax
integration is unlikely to survive the politics of the legislative process.

18. See Polito, supra note 5, at 29-34.
19. Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE
L.J. 325, 363-65 (1995). Shareholders of closely held enterprises do not face the same collective
action problems, and the result is clear. Closely held enterprise investors have received a more
favorable result than tax integration; they are able, as a class, to elect between functional tax
integration, see Polito, supra note 5, at 37-39, and inside shelter, see id. at 42-45.
20. See, e.g., Arlen & Weiss, supra note 19; Steven A. Bank, Corporate Managers, Agency
Costs, and the Rise of Double Taxation, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 167 (2002); Steven A. Bank,
Entity Theory as Myth in the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447,
533-37 (2001); Herwig J. Schlunk, The Zen of Corporate Capital Structure Neutrality, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 410, 411 n.8 (2000); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Three Versions of Tax Reform, 39 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 157, 173-74 (1997).
21. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115
Stat. 38; Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752.
22. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S
FISCAL YEAR 2004 REVENUE PROPOSALS 11-22 (2003).
23. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, §§ 302-303,
117 Stat. 752, 760-64 (adopting reduced rate dividend taxation for taxable years beginning through
2008); Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-222, § 102, 120
Stat. 345, 346 (extending reduced rate dividend taxation through taxable years beginning in 2010);
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-312, §102, 124 Stat. 3296, 3298-99 (extending reduced rate dividend taxation through taxable
years beginning in 2012).
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Existing System Operates at Cross-Purposes

Notwithstanding the unlikelihood that Congress will adopt
comprehensive and permanent corporate tax integration, the excess tax
burden generated by the classical tax regime is an ample incentive for
taxpayers to seek alternative means of escaping the excess burden of
double taxation. Taxpayers have long had and used multiple important
self-help tools to mitigate the burden of double taxation. At the same
time, the IRS sees itself as obliged to prevent self-help tax integration.
As in so many areas of the tax law, the double tax regime is actually a
hybrid system. In the case of tax integration, the system as a whole
operates at cross-purposes.
Double taxation coexists with numerous mechanisms that allow the
benefits of integration to selected taxpayers or to aggressive taxpayers.
Some of these are mechanisms that Congress has created deliberately,
some mechanisms have been created by the Treasury via regulatory fiat,
and others have been found—perhaps created—by aggressive taxpayer
exploitation of the interstices of the existing legal regime.24 Regardless
of their genesis, the coexistence of conflicting paradigms is the source of
ongoing tension between taxpayer and fisc that engenders much of the
existing regime’s legal and administrative complexity.
As long as the double tax system remains in place, taxpayers press
to escape it to the degree that the rewards are worth their efforts. The
IRS, for its part, sees itself as compelled to police for attempts, in whole
or in part, to bypass the second level of tax and must divine the extent to
which Congress is willing to allow that escape from double taxation.
This is no mean feat because Congress has clearly endorsed both thesis
and antithesis: double taxation and the escape from double taxation.
As long as full fiscal transparency is not achievable, some business
enterprise earnings will always be subject to the excess tax burden of
double taxation. At the same time, other business earnings will escape
double taxation. It is impossible to realize fully the anti-ideal of double
taxation, because slippage at the margins is unavoidable. The boundary
is and will remain arbitrary because it is defined by the extent to which
taxpayers are able to take advantage of the escape hatches in the double
tax anti-ideal. Yet the IRS bears significant burdens and the legal
system grows in complexity while attempting to close those escape
hatches.25

24. See Polito, supra note 5, at 36-40.
25. Id.
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The Laissez-Faire Approach to Constructive Dividends

The Laissez-Faire Approach proposes an alternative. Even though
the Integrationist Norm cannot be fully effectuated26 because the realities
of the political process, legal complexity, and administrative burden are
its inescapable enemies, the tax law regime should nevertheless avoid
operating at cross-purposes.
Complicated and administratively
burdensome, the legal and enforcement mechanisms that serve to defend
the double tax anti-ideal should be either marked for elimination or
simply disregarded, but only to the extent that those regimes reinforce
the double tax anti-ideal. At the same time, given that comprehensive
corporate tax integration is unlikely at best, and that the creation of new
regimes will not fully achieve the integrationist agenda in any case, the
Laissez-Faire Approach advances the integrationist agenda without the
creation of any significant new legal paradigms or regimes. Instead, it
pursues opportunities to advance the Integrationist Norm by declining to
defend the escape hatches in the existing double tax regime.
The Laissez-Faire Approach seeks to advance the Integrationist
Norm by taxpayer self-help rather than by assuming the burden of an
active integration program. As such, elements in the Laissez-Faire
Approach are designed to avoid, to the greatest extent possible, the need
to fashion new legal or enforcement regimes. Instead, the elements of
the Laissez-Faire Approach are designed principally to eliminate or
disregard existing legal and enforcement regimes. The regimes marked
for removal or disregard are those that serve to defend the double tax
anti-ideal.
The Laissez-Faire Approach, however, is not a program to facilitate
avoidance of income taxation entirely. The Integrationist Norm is for all
income to be taxable at the level of the individual taxpayers, as if they
conducted the businesses directly without the intervention of juridical
business organizations. Accordingly, the Laissez-Faire Approach avoids
mechanisms that would allow income to escape the full burden of the
individual income tax.27 In essence, the Laissez-Faire Approach
facilitates escape from corporate double taxation so long as doing so
preserves at least one level of taxation.
Thus, the Laissez-Faire Approach counsels dispensing with the
CDD to the extent that it serves to defend the double tax anti-ideal. It
also counsels retaining the CDD to the extent necessary to ensure that
26. See id. at 29-36.
27. The Laissez-Faire Approach is agnostic as to, and this Article does not address whether,
the ideal tax base is income or consumption.
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corporate earnings do not escape the normative single level of taxation.
Note that the manner in which any such modifications to the CDD
should be accomplished is an issue that this Article brackets. It presents
and assesses the desirability of the proposed modifications purely from
the perspective of advancing an integrationist agenda. It intentionally
sets aside the issue of whether there is authority for effecting its
proposals without explicit legislation.
IV. APPLYING THE LAISSEZ-FAIRE APPROACH
The next step in the Laissez-Faire Approach is to examine the
application of the CDD under various circumstances in light of the
Integrationist Norm and to determine the extent to which the CDD is
counter-productive and, therefore, should be set aside. At the outset it is
important to note that, because the aim of this analysis is to determine
the extent to which the CDD is unnecessary, the analysis considers only
transactions that otherwise would be treated as constructive dividends
under existing law. Under the existing CDD, a corporate transfer is a
constructive dividend if: (1) the primary purpose of the transfer is to
benefit shareholders rather than for a valid business purpose pertaining
to the corporation as an entity distinct from its shareholders; and (2) the
transfer causes property to leave the control of the transferring
corporation and to be subject to direct or indirect control by
shareholders.28 One manner of proving a valid business purpose is to
prove that the value the corporation receives in the transaction is at least
as great as the value it transfers.29 Thus, the transactions under
consideration are those that produce a net positive transfer from a
corporation to a shareholder or to a third party on behalf of a
shareholder. The CDD serves to ensure that those net transfers are
subject to double taxation.
While the CDD always serves to reinforce the double tax anti-ideal,
there are circumstances in which it may incidentally serve other
purposes as well. As outlined below, there may be cases in which
dispensing with the CDD may result in collecting less tax, either
absolutely or in present value terms, than the single level shareholder tax
of the Integrationist Norm. Dispensing with the CDD may introduce its
own distortions into the system. Then the question becomes a second-

28. See, e.g., Sammons v. Comm’r, 472 F.2d 449, 451 (5th Cir. 1973).
29. See Palmer v. United States, 302 U.S. 63, 69-70 (1937); Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v.
Comm’r, 580 F.2d 442, 446-47 (Cl. Ct. 1978); Rapid Elec. Co. v. Comm’r, 61 T.C. 232 (1974).
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best problem30 of judging which distortions are more problematic; those
induced by dispensing with the CDD or those induced by expending
valuable resources on a doctrine that reinforces the double tax anti-ideal.
A.

Constructive Dividends via Cash Payments

The first inquiry is into the appropriate shareholder treatment, in
light of the Integrationist Norm, of the relatively straightforward
scenario of a cash transfer. This is a transaction in which the corporation
neither conveys property nor acquires property. Rather, the corporation
either transfers cash to shareholders or transfers cash for the benefit of
shareholders, but it claims no income tax deduction in connection with
the transaction. It must be under circumstances that current law would
treat as a constructive dividend.
Such a transaction might take the form of a loan from the
corporation to a shareholder or a party related to the shareholder but for
which there is no intention for the corporation to be repaid, or it might
be a genuine loan initially but later be functionally cancelled by the
corporation. It might be a payment by a corporation that satisfies an
obligation of a shareholder. In many cases, and especially in closely
held corporations, corporate payments to or for the benefit of
shareholders can easily have facially ambiguous tax classifications and
are reclassified as dividend distributions by the IRS. These cash
distributions to or for the benefit of shareholders can have three possible
sources: (1) shareholders’ invested capital; (2) earnings and profits; or
(3) elements of corporate value, such as unrecognized appreciation in
assets and the anticipation of future earnings that have not yet been
included in earnings and profits.31
First, the return of shareholders’ capital ought not, in any case, to
be subject to shareholder-level taxation. The existing regime for explicit

30. Briefly stated, the theory of the second-best instructs that, if at least one market is
prevented from reaching its efficient equilibrium, it is not clear that the welfare maximizing
program will be to achieve efficient equilibria in the remaining markets. It is possible that creating
distortions in some markets will allow a more than offsetting reduction in distortions in other
markets. Therefore, if some allocative biases are unavoidable, economic welfare is generally not
maximized by eliminating all other distortions relative to optimal conditions. See generally R. G.
Lipsey & R. Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956)
(explaining the theory of the second-best); see also Edward Foster Hugo Sonnenschein, Price
Distortion and Economic Welfare, 38 ECONOMETRICA 281 (1970); Kunio Kawamata, Price
Distortion and Potential Welfare, 42 ECONOMETRICA 435 (1974) (stating elegantly the second best
proposition). For a general discussion of the theory of the second best, see P.R.G. LAYARD & A.A.
WALTERS, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 180-88 (1978).
31. See I.R.C. § 301(c) (2006).
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dividends acknowledges this and allows for partial classification as tax
free return of shareholder capital.32 In that same degree, constructive
dividends ought not to trigger shareholder-level taxation. Even under
the existing CDD, the application of the ordinary stacking rules would
make constructive distributions partially non-taxable return of capital to
the extent that the constructive distributions exceed earnings and
profits.33 Indeed, the Supreme Court has made it clear that, in the
absence of earnings and profits, the CDD cannot create a taxable
dividend, even if a shareholder intentionally diverts corporate funds to
support his personal expenditures.34 The return of shareholders’
invested capital is the simple case, but the next two possibilities present
a somewhat more complicated analysis.
i. Earnings Distributions
A constructive dividend, to the extent that it is funded out of
earnings and profits, represents earnings that have already been subject
to corporate-level taxation.35 In terms of the Integrationist Norm,
corporate earnings should be subject to a single level of taxation, not two
levels of taxation. If the integrationist ideal is fiscal transparency, it is
the shareholder-level tax rate schedule that should apply.
In principle, the preferable solution is to impose the shareholderlevel tax and allow a corresponding corporate deduction or to credit
shareholders for the tax paid by the corporation. That resolution would
require an act of Congress. If it were feasible to achieve this for
constructive dividends, it would most likely be possible to directly
achieve the same treatment for express dividends, and therefore achieve
some form of systematic tax integration.
However, the legislation necessary for systematic tax integration is
not feasible as a practical matter. It is precisely the unavailability of
systematic tax integration that leads to this Article’s examination of the

32. Id. § 301(c)(2).
33. Boulware v. United States, 552 U.S. 421, 424-25 (2008); Hillsboro Nat’l Bank v.
Comm’r, 460 U.S. 370, 392 (1983). See also FDIC v. First Heights Bank, FSB, 229 F.3d 528, 540
(6th Cir. 2000); United States v. D’Agostino, 145 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1998); Hagman v. Comm’r,
958 F.2d 684, 694 (6th Cir. 1992); Estate of DeNiro v. Comm’r, 746 F.2d 327, 332 (6th Cir. 1984);
Truesdell v. Comm’r, 89 T.C. 1280, 1294-95 (1987), acq. 1988-2 C.B. 1, recommended by AOD
1988-25, 1988 WL 570761; Barnard v. Comm’r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 571, 576-77 (2001).
34. Boulware, 552 U.S. 421.
35. Some of these amounts are functionally subject to a zero corporate tax rate, e.g. I.R.C. §
103 (state and local bond interest), but are included in earnings and profits, Treas. Reg. §1.312-6(b).
See notes 46-49 infra and accompanying text.
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CDD in light of the Laissez-Faire Approach.36 In that case, in light of
the Integrationist Norm, the corporate-level tax is best seen as a
surrogate for shareholder taxation. That makes the imposition of an
additional shareholder-level tax an excess tax burden. As such, to the
extent that the constructive dividend bails out earnings and profits, there
is no need to apply the CDD to impose the full shareholder-rate tax.
There remains, however, a pair of issues that need to be examined.
The first is any disparity between applicable corporate tax rates and
shareholder tax rates. If the Integrationist Norm is fiscal transparency, it
is the shareholder-level tax rate schedule that should apply. Surrogate
corporate-level taxation could result in over taxation or under taxation.
If the applicable individual tax rate is higher than the corporate tax rate,
it produces under taxation. If the applicable individual tax rate is lower
than the corporate tax rate, it produces over taxation.
There is good reason to estimate that the under taxation scenario
would be more common in practice than the over taxation scenario.
Well-advised taxpayers can easily seek to structure a transaction to be
deductible by the corporation and taxable at the lower shareholder-level
tax rate. For example, a transaction can be structured as a payment for
services or interest, which are deductible by the corporation and
included in shareholder income. If the applicable shareholder tax rate is
lower than the corporate rate, such a transaction produces a lower total
tax burden than bailing out previously taxed corporate earnings in a
manner that produces no corporate deduction and no shareholder
inclusion. In practice, therefore, if the corporate tax is accepted as the
single surrogate tax, setting aside the CDD would result more frequently
in the under taxation scenario than the over taxation scenario.37
A simple resolution to the under taxation question would be to
amend the corporate tax rate schedule to impose the maximum
individual income tax rate on all taxable corporate income.38 In terms of
the Laissez-Faire Approach, such an amendment would not be oriented
towards reinforcing double taxation39 but towards encouraging self-help
tax integration, with the expectation that the corporate tax would serve
as a surrogate and substitute for the normative single level shareholder36. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
37. In any case, in terms of the Laissez-Faire Approach, the over taxation scenario cannot
justify the continued application of the CDD. That the surrogate corporate-level tax is excessive
could not justify imposing an even greater excessive tax burden by also imposing a shareholderlevel tax via the CDD.
38. See Polito, supra note 5, at 50-51.
39. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Kwall, The Repeal of Graduated Corporate Tax Rates, 131 TAX
NOTES 1395 (2011).
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level tax. If the adoption of such legislation is not in the offing, the
question becomes how one judges the under taxation created by the
disparity between surrogate taxation at corporate rates versus the
normative shareholder rates.
Is preventing this form of under taxation sufficient to insist on a full
second level of tax at the ordinary income tax rates?40 A few
observations about the applicable rates shed some light on the subject.
The lowest two corporate tax rate brackets are relatively narrow,
applying to only the first $75,000 per year of corporate taxable income.
Their benefit is fully phased out in any year in which a corporation’s
taxable income is at least $335,000.41 There is a substantial 34% bracket
that is lower than the maximum individual tax rate.42 However, under
the tax rates adopted during the George W. Bush administration, that
34% corporate income tax rate became only a single percentage point
below the maximum 35% individual income tax rate,43 which has also
been the highest corporate tax rate.44 In fact, the maximum corporate tax
rate has been higher than the maximum individual tax rate in half of the
years since 1981. In the remaining years, the excess of the maximum

40. One might object that, at present, there are technically few such circumstances of under
taxation because of the application of capital gain tax rates to qualified dividend distributions.
I.R.C. § 1(h)(11) (2006). The maximum shareholder tax rate with respect to qualified dividend
distributions is 15%, I.R.C. § 1(h), which is also the lowest income tax rate at the surrogate
corporate level, I.R.C. § 11(b). However, the reduced tax rates on qualified dividend distributions
were themselves adopted as a form of partial tax integration. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-94, at 27-8
(2003) See also Rosanne Altshuler, Benjamin H. Harris & Eric Toder, Capital Income Taxation
and Progressivity in a Global Economy, 30 VA. TAX REV. 355, 357-58 (2010); Steven A. Bank, The
Rise and Fall of Post-World War II Tax Reform, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 207, 207 (2010);
Michael Doran, Managers, Shareholders, and the Corporate Double Tax, 95 VA. L. REV. 517, 52526 (2009); Steven A. Bank, Dividends and a Tax Policy in the Long Run, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 533,
537-40 (2007). They assume full corporate-level taxation. As such, the corporate-level tax cannot
be seen as a surrogate for the reduced tax on qualified dividends, because the latter were not
adopted as the normative single shareholder level of tax. Instead, the appropriate baseline for
judging the adequacy of surrogate corporate-level taxation is the full ordinary income tax rate.
Moreover, not all distributions deemed to be dividends under the CDD would be qualified dividend
distributions, and the reduced rates applicable to qualified dividends are not scheduled to apply to
dividend distributions in tax years beginning in 2013 or later. See supra note 23.
41. I.R.C. § 11(b) (2006).
42. Id.
43. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107- 16, § 101,
115 Stat. 38, 41-42. That maximum individual income tax rate is currently scheduled to revert to
39.6% for taxable years beginning after 2012. Id. § 901, 115 Stat. at 150; Tax Relief,
Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, §
101, 124 Stat. 3296, 3298.
44. I.R.C. § 11(b) (2006).
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individual tax rate over the maximum corporate tax rate has been quite
small, and always less than five percentage points.45
Under those circumstances, the potential amount of under taxation
by applying the corporate tax rates as a single surrogate tax is relatively
small in comparison to the large amount of over taxation that applies by
double taxation. While this raises an empirical question beyond the
scope of this Article, it seems reasonable to conclude that the economic
distortion from relatively small amounts of potential under taxation is
worth the mitigation of the economic distortions from double taxation.
In making this comparison, it is important to bear in mind that a contrary
conclusion also incurs the deadweight loss of IRS administrative and
judicial resources, and taxpayer planning and compliance costs that
result from the enforcement of the CDD. As such, while this is a point
on which reasonable minds might make a different judgment, so long as
the corporate tax rates remain in close proximity to individual income
tax rates, the Integrationist Norm makes the use of the CDD to impose a
second level of tax on corporate earnings a poor use of resources. In
addition, accepting surrogate taxation at the corporate rates provides an
incentive for Congress to resolve the under taxation issue by imposing
the maximum individual income tax rate to all taxable corporate income.
Another potential issue is the treatment of various tax preferences.
Allowing the distribution of corporate earnings via constructive
dividends implicitly resolves this issue. It effectively allows the benefit
of preferences to be passed on to shareholders because it does not force
the shareholder-level taxation of the constructive distribution of items
that were not fully taxable at the corporate level.46
45. JEFFREY L. KWALL, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS,
PARTNERSHIPS, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, AND THEIR OWNERS 7 (3d ed. 2005). Compare
Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 301, 92 Stat. 2763, 2820 (1978); Tax Reform Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 601, 100 Stat. 2085, 2249 (1986); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13221(a), 107 Stat. 312, 477 (1993) (legislating maximum corporate
income tax rates), with Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 101, 95 Stat.
172, 176-85 (1981); Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 101, 100 Stat. 2085, 2096-99
(1986); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-58, § 11101(a), 104 Stat.
1388, 1388-403 to 1388-405; Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No 103-66, §§
13201-13202, 107 Stat. 312, 457-61; Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 101, 115 Stat. 38, 41-42; Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 105, 117 Stat. 752, 755 (legislating maximum individual income tax
rates).
46. The analysis presumes that the existing concept of earnings and profits applies. While it
is possible, in principle, to legislate a modified definition of earnings and profits that would prevent
the pass-through of tax preferences, the assumption of such legislation is hard to reconcile with the
premise that comprehensive tax integration is not feasible in practice. See supra notes 17-23 and
accompanying text. The Laissez-Faire approach is premised on working within the existing tax
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While some integration proposals would require a shareholder-level
tax on the distribution of these earnings, others would allow for taxexempt corporate income to be distributed without triggering a
shareholder-level tax.47 Pure integrationism treats preferences as a
distinct question from the integration question. It does not address the
wisdom of any particular tax benefit, but it does posit that taxpayers
ought to be equally eligible for preferences regardless of the legal form
in which their businesses are conducted. As such, an idealized passthrough paradigm of integration would pass the benefit of tax-exemption
and most other tax preferences on to shareholders.48 The more or less
automatic pass-through of preferences by not applying the CDD in this
circumstance accomplishes this end.49
This analysis allows for a conclusion based on the Integrationist
Norm. Admittedly, it is a conclusion with which one could reasonably
disagree, even within that framework. That conclusion is that, to the
extent that a cash transaction is not deducted at the corporate level and
bails out corporate earnings and profits, it is not necessary to apply the
CDD to impose a second tax at the shareholder level, so long as there
remains no more than a small excess of the maximum individual tax rate
over corporate tax rates. Under the Integrationist Norm, the use of the
regime, without a program of comprehensive tax integration, to facilitate self-help tax integration.
It avoids, to the greatest extent possible, the need to fashion new legal or enforcement regimes.
Instead, the elements of the Laissez-Faire Approach are designed principally to eliminate or
disregard existing legal and enforcement regimes to the extent that they serve to backstop the double
tax anti-ideal.
47. Compare U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND
CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS, TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE 15-20 (1992) (recommending against
the extension of integration benefits to tax preference items), with ALVIN C. WARREN, JR.,
INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE INCOME TAXES; REPORTER’S STUDY OF
CORPORATE TAX INTEGRATION 108-12 (The American Law Institute ed., 1993) (proposing that the
benefit of specified corporate tax exemptions and tax credits be passed on to shareholders in
integration). See also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Treatment of Corporate Preference Items Under
an Integrated Tax System: A Comparative Analysis, 44 TAX LAW. 195 (1990) (analyzing the
methods eight industrialized countries use to limit the pass-through of preferences in integration).
48. See, e.g., CHARLES E. MCLURE, JR., MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TWICE?, 13132 (1979) (arguing that investment tax credits should be passed through to shareholders); Harry M.
Kitchen, Canada, in COMPARATIVE TAX SYSTEMS: EUROPE, CANADA AND JAPAN 341, 360 (Joseph
A. Pechman ed., 1987); Anthony P. Polito, A Proposal for an Integrated Income Tax, 12 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 1009, 1036-37 (1989) (arguing that tax preferences given to corporations should be
retained “but only to the extent . . . available to taxpayers who do not avail themselves of the
corporate form”).
49. The application of capital gain tax rates to qualified dividends, I.R.C. § 1(h)(11), does not
attempt to distinguish corporate earnings subject to full corporate-level taxation from preference
items. As such, it allows the partial pass-through of preference items even as it continues to impose
a reduced second level of tax on corporate earnings already subject to a full corporate surrogate tax.
See, e.g., Altshuler, Harris & Toder, supra note 40, at 358.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012

15

Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 27 [2012], Art. 1

7- POLITO_MACRO FINAL.DOCM

16

4/11/2012 1:23 PM

AKRON TAX JOURNAL

[27:1

CDD to impose a shareholder-level tax on earnings that have already
been accounted for at the corporate level is largely counterproductive. It
expends valuable judicial, IRS administrative, and taxpayer planning and
compliance resources to undermine the Integrationist Norm. With that
conclusion as a predicate, the next step is to consider anticipation
distributions.50
ii. Anticipation Distributions
Cash transactions treated by the CDD as dividend distributions, to
the extent that they exceed both earnings and profits already taken into
account by the corporation and also shareholders’ invested capital,
represent a distribution of corporate value that has not yet been
recognized and therefore not yet included in earnings and profits.51 That
value can be the anticipation either of the future recognition of built-in
gain in corporate assets or of other future corporate income. The
monetization of these anticipated earnings, without triggering
recognition and thereby bringing them within the ambit of earnings and
profits, could easily occur by means of borrowing. Those borrowing
proceeds would represent value that has not been subject to previous
taxation at either the corporate or the shareholder level, but rather an
anticipation of future earnings that will be subject, at least in principle,
to the corporate income tax at a later date.52
This scenario raises the issue of deferral.53 Shareholders thereby
access future corporate earnings without triggering a current tax at either
the shareholder or corporate level. At some time in the future, the

50. It is worth noting the possibility of a contrary conclusion that does not reject the
Integrationist Norm. Such a conclusion would not imply that imposing double taxation via the
CDD is beneficial in itself. It would instead be predicated on a view that the harmful distortions
generated by continuing to impose double taxation via the CDD are in some sense less significant
than those that would be generated by the under-taxation of the amount distributed and/or the
implicit pass-through of preference items. Such a contrary conclusion would, of course, eliminate
the need to proceed to the analysis of anticipation distributions because the CDD would continue to
apply as at present.
51. See Treas. Reg. § 1.312-6(b).
52. One wonders how common the use of cash constructively to distribute these untaxed
anticipated earnings would be in practice. Such a scenario would apply only to corporations that
have managed to bail out the full amount of current and accumulated earnings and profits and an
additional amount equal to shareholders’ stock basis, but that nevertheless continue to transfer value
out of corporate solution to their shareholders or for their shareholders’ benefit. Any further
comment on frequency would be sheer guesswork, but it is a fair guess that the scenario would be
more likely if the CDD were no longer used to impose a shareholder-level tax on these distributions.
53. See Anthony P. Polito, The Role of Prescription in the Interpretive Problem of Basis
Determination, 53 TAX LAW. 615, 626-27 (2000); Polito, supra note 10, at 505-13.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol27/iss1/1

16

Polito: Constructive Dividend Doctrine from an Integrationist Perspective

7- POLITO_MACRO FINAL.DOCM

2012]

4/11/2012 1:23 PM

CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDEND DOCTRINE

17

corporation presumably will need to recognize income, which will
trigger full taxation at the corporate level at that future time. On the
other hand, it is not possible to determine ex ante the extent of that
deferral. Under those circumstances, is it appropriate for the corporation
to be able to monetize future taxable earnings to fund constructive
dividends without any current taxation at the shareholder level?
This issue arises only if the constructive dividend exceeds both
current and accumulated earnings and profits and shareholders’ basis in
their stock, whose treatment under the CDD has already been analyzed.
This is the appropriate conceptualization because, in the case of an
admitted dividend, actual distributions are treated as primarily out of
current and accumulated earnings and profits and secondarily as a return
of shareholders’ basis.54 Nevertheless, in the case of an admitted
dividend, distributions in excess of those two amounts are treated as gain
on sale,55 which generally is subject to a shareholder-level capital gains
tax.56 Here the question is whether, in light of the Integrationist Norm, a
constructive dividend in excess of earnings and profits and shareholders’
capital ought to be subject to some immediate taxation.
By way of comparison, if a stock redemption is treated as a sale,57 it
has the potential to bail out anticipated earnings while generating
shareholder taxation at capital gain rates.58 Such a bailout also raises the
issue of deferral, but the shareholder-level capital gains tax “pays” for
the deferral. The shareholder-level tax at the time of the distribution at
least partially offsets the deferral benefit, in time value of money terms,
of being able to anticipate corporate earnings without immediately
triggering the corporate-level surrogate tax. It is not at all inconceivable
that it might more than fully offset those deferral benefits.59
In fact, to the extent that stock value reflects an anticipation of
future earnings,60 any sale of stock at capital gain rates gives access to
future earnings without triggering full current taxation of those
earnings.61 Nevertheless, there is a tax charge for accessing future
earnings without triggering the full surrogate taxation of those earnings.
In terms of the Integrationist Norm, that tax may well be considered the
price for the deferral of full taxation of the anticipated earnings.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
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A different point of comparison is the shareholders’ ability to
borrow against the value of appreciated shares, or for that matter any
other appreciated property, without current recognition of income.62
Doing so is a well-known technique for gaining access to liquidity
without current taxation.63 The ultimate need to repay out of tax-paid
income measures the extent of deferral. To the extent that shareholder
borrowing against share value is a realistic alternative, allowing the
corporation to borrow in order to fund constructive dividends without
triggering any shareholder tax allows no more deferral in principle than
under existing practice.
Fiscal transparency that applies only the shareholder level of tax is
the Integrationist Norm. Because the partnership paradigm appears to be
the nearest alternative possible to the integrationist ideal, an examination
of an analogous transaction in the partnership context may provide
useful insights. Because of the priority for already recognized earnings
under the stacking rules for dividend distributions,64 the analogous
transaction must be one in which a partnership distributes an amount that
exceeds income that has already been allocated among partners under
Subchapter K.65 In at least some circumstances, a partnership can
engage in anticipation borrowing and distribute those amounts without
triggering any tax.

62. See, e.g., Woodsam Assocs., Inc. v. Comm’r, 198 F.2d 357, 359 (2d Cir. 1952)
(concluding that a nonrecourse secured borrowing transaction is not a realization event and does not
increase the taxpayer’s basis in the property securing the debt). Likewise, an early Treasury
Regulation provides that “[i]f bonds are issued by a corporation at their face value, the corporation
realizes no gain or loss.” Treas. Reg. 62, Article 545 (1922). See Polito, supra note 10, at 481-513
(setting forth an extensive consideration of the issue of nontaxable borrowing transactions).
63. Promotional literature of the Private Client Services Group of Goldman, Sachs & Co.
indicates that:
This Group is routinely asked to make presentations for clients who own concentrated
stock positions on the innovative strategies that are available to monetize, diversify or
hedge a stock position without selling the stock and incurring a taxable gain . . . . [and
the] alternatives available to a client with low basis stock, including the following:
-Borrow against your stock
-Exchanging the return of your stock for the return of a diversified portfolio
-Exchanging your stock for shares in a diversified fund
-Executing a short sale or a synthetic sale and reinvesting the proceeds in a diversified
portfolio
-Selling unregistered shares to Goldman Sachs
-Hedging your risk with over-the-counter options.
Goldman, Sachs & Co. Promotional Material (June 6, 1994) (on file with the author) (emphasis
added).
64. I.R.C. § 301(c) (2006).
65. Id. §§ 702, 705, 731 (2006).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol27/iss1/1

18

Polito: Constructive Dividend Doctrine from an Integrationist Perspective

7- POLITO_MACRO FINAL.DOCM

2012]

4/11/2012 1:23 PM

CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDEND DOCTRINE

19

When a partnership borrows, no income tax is triggered, just as in
the case of any other borrowing transaction. Each partner is treated as
having made a contribution of money to the partnership equal to that
partner’s deemed share of the debt incurred,66 even if the debt is
nonrecourse debt for which the partners bear no individual liability.67
As such, each partner’s basis in partnership interest is increased by the
amount of that partner’s share of the debt.68 In general, money
distributed to a partner is not taxable if it does not exceed the partner’s
newly increased basis in the partnership interest,69 and then the basis in
the partnership interest is correspondingly reduced.70
The partnership debt presumably needs to be paid at some future
time. The later income used to pay the debt is to be included in partners’
distributive shares, even though they don’t actually receive it because it
must be used to pay the debt. That income increases their bases in
partnership interests,71 but, to the extent that it is used to retire the
partnership debt, the debt reduction is treated as a distribution72 that
reduces basis by an offsetting amount.73
Thus, at this later time, the partners are subject to full taxation on
the income that was anticipated and distributed via the earlier debt. As
such, in a partnership context, it is possible in at least some
circumstances to make anticipation distributions without any current
taxation. The taxation is effectively deferred until the debt is paid out of
income subject to taxation.74
What does this suggest about applying the CDD to anticipation
distributions? A couple of observations oppose allowing indefinite
deferral. First, notwithstanding the necessarily arbitrary nature of what
66. Id. § 752(a) (2006).
67. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3.
68. I.R.C. § 722 (2006).
69. Id. § 731(a)(1). In particular circumstances, there may be factors that interfere with the
non-taxability of this borrow and distribute scenario. For example, the borrowing and distribution
may be deemed to be part of a larger disguised sale transaction, I.R.C. § 707(a). Even to the extent
that distributing borrowed funds is efficacious in producing non-taxability, some might object to it
to the extent that it depends upon increasing partners’ basis in partnership interests on account of
partnership nonrecourse debt. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3. By way of comparison, in the S
corporation context, share basis is not increased on account of borrowing at the corporate level. See
I.R.C. § 1367 (2006).
70. I.R.C. § 705(a)(2) (2006).
71. Id. § 705(a)(1).
72. Id. § 752(b).
73. Id. § 705(a)(2).
74. If the debt is never paid, in principle, there should nevertheless be an equal amount of
cancellation of debt income that should be subject to taxation at some future date, I.R.C. §§
61(a)(12), 108 (2006).
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constitutes a realization event,75 it is not unreasonable to see as a
realization event a transaction that removes from corporate solution any
value that has not yet been subject to corporate taxation. Thus, the
Integrationist Norm should not necessarily object to a mechanism that
forces a single level of taxation at the time of a constructive anticipation
distribution.
Second, this Article is premised on the Integrationist Norm that
corporate double taxation is so clearly mistaken that a Laissez-Faire
Approach to self-help tax integration is amply justified, even in the
absence of a systematic program to eliminate corporate double taxation.
The logic of the Integrationist Norm has nothing to say, either positive
or negative, about the use of a self-help tax integration mechanism to
create a new opportunity for indefinite tax deferral. Prudence may well
counsel against using the Laissez-Faire Approach to reach beyond the
Integrationist Norm itself to create an additional unlimited deferral
opportunity.76 Creating such an opportunity would certainly do
nothing—in a political sense—to advance the cause of the Integrationist
Norm. While this is clearly a question upon which reasonable minds can
differ, these observations present a plausible case for the desirability of
continuing to apply the CDD to impose current taxation of anticipation
distributions.
On the other hand, the truth is that the income tax is shot through
with opportunities for tax deferral. Some of these are the result of the
administrability problems of pure accretionism. Others are conscious
policy choices.77 The analysis above illustrates this. A priori, it is
difficult to conclude why one additional deferral opportunity is more

75. See, e.g., WILLIAM WALLACE HEWETT, THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AND ITS
APPLICATION IN FEDERAL TAXATION 82-83 (1925); Steven A. Bank, Mergers, Taxes, and
Historical Realism, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1, 64 (2000); Clarissa Potter, Mark-to-Market Taxation as the
Way to Save the Income Tax–A Former Administrator’s View, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 879, 882-86
(1999); Stanley S. Surrey, The Supreme Court and the Federal Income Tax: Some Implications of
the Recent Decisions, 35 ILL. L. REV. NW. U. 779, 783-84 (1941).
76. If one were of the view that the appropriate tax base is consumption rather than income,
one could conclude that indefinite deferral with respect to an anticipation distribution is not
problematic so long as the value is not used for consumption expenditures. In the context of setting
aside the CDD, however, it would be necessary to create a substitute mechanism to police the
distinction between constructive anticipation distributions that fund consumption from those that do
not and also another mechanism to ensure taxation no later than the time that distributed value is
used to fund personal consumption. Such a program is possible but hardly in keeping with the spirit
of the Laissez-Faire Approach. See Polito, supra note 5, at 40-42. In any case, the Integrationist
Norm need not necessarily imply a preference for consumption taxation over income taxation.
77. See Polito, supra note 10.
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problematic than any of the others already available.78 In that sense,
there is a good argument that concerns about deferral are not sufficient
to justify reinforcing the double tax anti-ideal by applying the CDD to
anticipation distributions.
iii. Implementation Problems of Disentangling Anticipation
Distributions
The question of whether to apply the CDD to anticipation
distributions may be decided by the practicability of implementation. If
the conclusion is to allow the deferral created by not applying the CDD
to anticipation distributions, then implementation is straightforward.
The CDD would not be applied at all to the kind of cash transactions
under consideration in this Part IV.A. The alternative is to ask whether
it is possible to apply the CDD in a manner that taxes anticipation
distributions but not distributions out of earnings already taken into
account at the corporate level.79 There are two possible scenarios; one is
simple and the other is not.
The simple scenario is that of a corporation that has neither current
nor accumulated earnings and profits. The Supreme Court has made it
clear that, in the absence of earnings and profits, the CDD cannot create
a taxable dividend.80 Instead, the entire deemed distribution must be
either non-taxable return of shareholder capital or gain from the
disposition of property, i.e., an anticipation distribution that is generally
taxable at capital gain rates.81
The more complicated scenario is that of a corporation that does
have a positive earnings and profits account. The question is whether
the CDD can be applied only to the extent that a constructive dividend
The
exceeds corporate earnings and shareholder stock basis.82
complication of implementation is keeping track of those thresholds if

78. An additional issue is the potential for under taxation because of the disparity between the
corporate tax rate schedule and the normative individual tax rate schedule. Taken in isolation, the
issue here is no different than it is in the case of corporate earnings distributions. See supra notes
37-45 and accompanying text. However, the confluence of the two issues is worth noting. In the
case of anticipation distributions, if there is no shareholder-level tax, there is both an indefinite
deferral of the tax and an under tax to the extent that the ultimate corporate tax rate is less than the
normative individual tax rate.
79. If the conclusion of Part 4.1.1. is rejected, the CDD applies as it does today to both
earnings distributions and anticipation distributions, and therefore the implementation discussion is
moot because there is no change in the application of the CDD.
80. Boulware v. United States, 552 U.S. 421 (2008).
81. See supra notes 32-34, 54-56 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 32-50 and accompanying text.
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earnings and profits and shareholder basis are not actually adjusted to
reflect prior constructive dividend bailout transactions.83 It doesn’t seem
appropriate to place the burden on the IRS to keep track of each
corporation’s cumulative constructive dividend transactions, which
would be necessary in some form to determine whether a transaction
crosses the threshold into the territory of anticipation distributions. The
goal of the Laissez-Faire Approach is to mitigate the administrative
burden of regimes operating counterproductively to the Integrationist
Norm. Its purpose is not well served by creating a new administrative
burden for the IRS.
The task could be accomplished informally by taxpayers keeping
track of total amounts bailed out in relation to (1) earnings and profits
accounts (accounting for reductions as a result of any amounts
distributed via explicit dividends) and (2) shareholder basis. Perhaps
taxpayers could be induced to perform this task, if it were widely
understood that the IRS would not seek shareholder income tax
adjustments under the CDD so long as taxpayers could prove the
absence of anticipation distributions. If this were accompanied by an
understanding that the CDD would be applied to the full amount of any
constructive dividend in the absence of such proof, taxpayers would
have an incentive to prove the absence of anticipation distributions and
also to refrain from engaging in such anticipation distributions at all.
One is compelled to avoid excessive sanguinity about this
possibility. So long as the CDD is being applied to impose shareholder
tax in some cases, one must wonder how eager taxpayers will be to
create a document trail proving that particular transactions, which they
claim are not dividend distributions at all, are actually bailing out only
prior corporate earnings rather than the anticipation of future earnings.
Further, one is compelled to wonder how the IRS could effectively
convey the assurances required. Even if the burden of proof is placed on
taxpayers, the IRS would still need to examine that proof via the audit
process.
On the other hand, that audit process might be much simplified in a
case in which the taxpayer can prove that the amounts bailed out do not
cross the threshold into anticipation distributions. There may well be
cases in which an abbreviated audit process proves this to be true. In
83. The analysis has to assume that there are no such adjustments. If Congress could marshal
the necessary majorities explicitly to authorize the adjustments, it presumably would also be
practicable to enact explicit dividend relief that would allow earnings and profits to be distributed
without shareholder taxation of an explicit dividend. The premise of this Article is that this is not
possible as a practical matter. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
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those cases, the Laissez-Faire Approach counsels that further IRS pursuit
of the matter under the CDD is a counterproductive waste of resources.
The question is whether the implementation problem of the limited
application of the CDD to anticipation distributions can be overcome in
a manner that yields a net savings in administrative resources.
If that is not possible, the matter becomes an all-or-nothing
proposition of whether the CDD should be dispensed with entirely.
Under the CDD, the shareholder-level charge for the deferral on
constructive anticipation distributions will also include a full second
level of tax for corporate earnings that have already been subject to a
corporate-level tax. It is not unrealistic to predict that, in terms of the
Integrationist Norm, this might be a serious overcompensation for the
deferral benefit.
If the shareholder-level tax is no more than the preferential capital
gains rate, as in effect for many dividend distributions through taxable
years beginning before 2013,84 the potential excess tax burden resulting
from the application of the CDD is perhaps not that great. However, if
the shareholder-level tax is to be imposed at the full ordinary income tax
rates, then the application of the CDD might seem as a bit like overkill
for the deferral issue. It might be dispensed with entirely, and some
other mechanism might be created for the purpose of addressing the
deferral issue within the context of the Integrationist Norm. One
possibility would be to create a mechanism triggering corporate-level
recognition on debt incurred to fund explicit or constructive distributions
to shareholders. Because the Laissez-Faire Approach targets only
existing regimes that serve to reinforce the double tax anti-ideal, the full
fleshing out of such an alternative mechanism to address the deferral
question is beyond the scope of this Article.
Regardless of whether an independent resolution of the deferral
issue for anticipation distributions is feasible, the Laissez-Faire
Approach makes a strong case for dispensing with the CDD in at least
some cash transaction scenarios. If the CDD continues to apply as under
current law, it is a second-best solution predicated on a judgment that
deferral, or a difference between corporate and individual tax rates, or of

84. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, §§ 302-303,
117 Stat. 752, 760-64 (adopting reduced rate dividend taxation for taxable years beginning through
2008); Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-222, § 102, 120
Stat. 345, 346 (extending reduced rate dividend taxation through taxable years beginning in 2010);
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-312, § 102, 124 Stat. 3296, 3298-99 (extending reduced rate dividend taxation through taxable
years beginning in 2012).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012

23

Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 27 [2012], Art. 1

7- POLITO_MACRO FINAL.DOCM

24

4/11/2012 1:23 PM

AKRON TAX JOURNAL

[27:1

the pass-through of preference items create more serious concerns than
the distortions of double taxation. This is an empirical question beyond
the scope of this Article. However, in judging which is the more serious
distortion, it is important to bear in mind the deadweight loss generated
to the extent that judicial, IRS, and taxpayer resources are wasted via the
use of the CDD to enforce the double tax anti-ideal.
B.

Overpriced Transfers of Property to Corporations

The next scenario to consider is the overpriced purchase scenario in
which a corporation pays more than fair market value for assets it
acquires from shareholders.85 The application of the CDD makes the
overpayment a dividend distribution.86 For purposes of this analysis, the
amount of the overpayment is no different than a cash transaction to or
on behalf of shareholders. In that sense, and subject to the same caveats
as an actual cash transaction, dispensing with the CDD is certainly at
least as advisable from the perspective of the Integrationist Norm.87
Further, there are circumstances that can easily overcome the
concerns raised above88 with regard to deferral when anticipated
earnings are distributed via a constructive dividend without triggering a
shareholder-level tax. If the transferor of the asset is a taxable domestic
person, the full amount of the overpayment is taxed at that level, in
many cases at capital gain rates. Thus, there is a shareholder-level tax of
the overpayment.
By way of comparison, if a stock redemption is treated as a sale,89 it
has the potential to bail out anticipated earnings while generating
shareholder taxation at capital gain rates.90 Such a bailout also raises the
issue of deferral, but the shareholder-level capital gains tax “pays” for
the deferral. The shareholder-level tax at the time of the distribution at
least partially offsets the deferral benefit, in time value of money terms,
of being able to anticipate corporate earnings without immediately

85. For purposes of this discussion, an overpayment transaction between a corporation and its
shareholders also includes such an overpayment to a third-party in which the overpayment is made
to the third party for the benefit of a shareholder. See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 279 U.S.
716 (1929); Baumer v. United States, 580 F.2d 863, 882-83 (5th Cir. 1978).
86. See BORRIS I. BITTKER, JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶8.05[5] (7th ed. 2006) (hereinafter “Bittker & Eustice”).
87. See supra notes 31-84 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 51-78 and accompanying text.
89. I.R.C. §§ 302, 303, 304, 356 (2006).
90. See Clark, supra note 11, at 107-17.
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triggering the corporate-level surrogate tax. It is not at all inconceivable
that it might more than fully offset those deferral benefits.91
In fact, to the extent that stock value reflects an anticipation of
future earnings,92 any sale of stock at capital gain rates gives access to
future earnings without triggering a full current tax of those earnings.93
Nevertheless, there is a tax charge for accessing future earnings without
triggering the full surrogate taxation of those earnings. As previously
observed, in terms of the Integrationist Norm, that tax may well be
considered the cost for the deferral of full taxation of the anticipated
earnings. The counsel of the Laissez-Faire Approach is that so long as
the transferor of an asset is taxable on the amount of the overpayment,
even at capital gain rates, it is better not to waste valuable resources on a
counterproductive application of the CDD.94 In other cases, dispensing
with the CDD in the overpayment scenario is no more objectionable than
in the cash distribution scenario.
C.

Bargain Transfers of Property from Corporations to Shareholders

The obverse of the overpayment scenario is that in which a
corporation makes a bargain transfer of property to shareholders.95 If a
corporation conveys property to shareholders at a bargain price, one
possibility is to ignore the discount and have the shareholder establish
basis in the property at the discount price. At least in principle, the
amount of discount will be subject to shareholder-level taxation upon a

91. See Polito, supra note 5, at 66-67.
92. See Brealey, Myers & Allen, supra note 8, at 78-93.
93. See Clark, supra note 11, at 107-17.
94. The Laissez-Faire Approach does not object to reducing the acquiring corporation’s basis
in the asset to its fair market value in order to avoid overstatement of depreciation deductions or
understatement of gain on a subsequent disposition of the asset.
95. For purposes of this discussion, a bargain transaction between a corporation and its
shareholders also includes bargain transactions between a corporation and third-parties in which the
discount is given to the third party for the benefit of a shareholder. See Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716 (1929); Baumer v. United States, 580 F.2d 863, 882-83 (5th Cir. 1978).
Also included is the corporate distribution of options to acquire stock or other property from the
corporation. Under present practice, if the option can be valued when issued, the relevant discount
is that between the value of the option and the price the recipient pays for the option. If the option
cannot be valued when issued, the relevant discount is the spread between the option’s exercise
price and the fair market value of the underlying property when the option is exercised or sold. See
Redding v. Comm’r, 630 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1980); Baumer v. Comm’r, 580 F.2d 863 (5th Cir.
1978); Rev. Rul. 70-521, 1970-2 C.B. 72. For purposes of this Article, the analysis of that discount
is not materially different from any other discount sale of property to shareholders.
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later disposition of the property.96 In practice, however, there are a
number of reasons that might not be considered an adequate resolution.
• The property might be subject to ordinary tax rates in the
corporation’s hands but preferential capital gains rates97 in the
shareholder’s hands.
• The gain might never be taxed because the property’s basis might
be stepped up to full value at the death of the shareholder.98
• If the shareholder is a foreign person, the gain might never be
taxed because it is foreign source income,99 if the property is not
a U.S. real property interest.100
• If the shareholder is a tax exempt entity, the gain might never be
taxed because it is not included in unrelated business taxable
income.101
These seem ample reason to conclude that the discount cannot be
ignored entirely.
The next possibility is to continue to apply the CDD as it applies
currently, but, from the perspective of the Integrationist Norm, that
would be overkill. If the discount to the shareholder is a constructive
dividend,102 then presumably, under existing law, an identical amount
must be accounted for as additional sales price to the corporation.103 In
effect, the discounted sale should be treated the same as a cash
distribution of the amount of the discount to the shareholder and then the
use of that cash as part of the purchase price of the property. That
produces both a corporate tax and a shareholder tax on the amount of the
discount,104 which is clearly contrary to the Integrationist Norm. A
single level of tax is sufficient.105 For this Article, the question becomes
one of selecting the appropriate party to tax.
The first option is to collect the tax solely at the shareholder level,
and not at the corporate level. In effect, the first option is the same
96. This possibility clearly raises a deferral issue that is itself deferred until later in the
analysis. See infra notes 110-18 and accompanying text.
97. I.R.C. § 1(h) (2006).
98. Id. §§ 1014, 1022.
99. Id. § 865.
100. Id. § 897.
101. Id. §§ 511-515.
102. Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1(j).
103. I.R.C. § 311(b) (2006).
104. Clearly, the double tax scenario applies in the case of a discounted sale of appreciated
corporate property only. See I.R.C. § 311(a).
105. Equivalent analysis applies to the tax treatment of a discount rental, leasing, or licensing
of property. In principle, the CDD currently requires two levels of taxation but a single level of
taxation should be normative. See Bittker & Eustice, supra note 86, at ¶8.05[4].
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treatment as the reinstatement of the General Utilities doctrine106 via the
repeal of section 311(b). At the shareholder level, the ordinary stacking
rules for dividend distributions will determine how much of the discount
is a dividend out of earnings and profits, how much is nontaxable return
of shareholder capital, and how much is gain from the disposition of
property.107
The analysis of that possibility begins with the treatment of a
shareholder that is a fully taxable U.S. person. If the amount of the
discount is no more than the corporation’s current and accumulated
earnings and profits, then, in terms of the Integrationist Norm, the result
is unproblematic. The discount is fully taxable as ordinary income.108
The corporation’s earnings and profits are correspondingly reduced.109
If the discount exceeds a threshold amount of the corporation’s predistribution earnings and profits, however, then a portion of the
constructive distribution is treated as either non-taxable return of capital
or as gain on the disposition of property.110 The deemed distribution will
not be fully taxable on a current basis at the shareholder level and will

106. See Gen. Util. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
107. I.R.C. § 301(c) (2006).
108. Id. § 301(c)(1). This analysis does not hold under the current circumstances under which
qualified dividend distributions are subject capital gain tax rates, with a maximum tax rate of 15%.
Id. §1(h). The reduced tax rates on these qualified dividend distributions were themselves adopted
as a form of partial tax integration. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-94, at 27-8 (2003) See also Altshuler,
Harris & Toder, supra note 40, at 357-58; Bank, supra note 40, at 207; Doran, supra note 40, at
525-26; Bank, supra note 40, at 537-40. They assume full corporate-level taxation. As such, they
are not a sufficient substitute for corporate-level taxation. However, the reduced rates applicable to
qualified dividends are not scheduled to apply to dividend distributions in tax years beginning in
2013 or later. See supra note 23. The analysis is predicated on the expiration of reduced tax rates
on qualified dividend distributions.
109. A potential complication for this analysis is that the lack of corporate-level taxation
implies that the there is no addition to the earnings and profits account as a result of that discount.
Had the corporation been taxed on the amount of the discount, earnings and profits would have been
increased by the amount of the tax less the marginal corporate taxes on that gain, hereinafter
referred to as the “E&P Bump.” Because the E&P Bump would be less than the corporation’s predistribution earnings and profits, the failure correspondingly to increase earnings and profits is
unproblematic. It is true that a portion of a future dividend distribution that would otherwise have
been subject to tax as dividend would be treated as either non-taxable return of capital or as gain on
the disposition of property, most likely taxable at capital gain tax rates. I.R.C. § 301(c). The
Integrationist Norm, however, makes this unobjectionable because those amounts, up to the amount
of the full deemed dividend, would have already been subject to a full shareholder-level tax via the
taxation of the discount as a dividend. Any further tax would be an excess tax. Therefore, the
shareholder-level tax is more than sufficient under these circumstances.
110. I.R.C. §301(c). If the E&P Bump were included in earnings and profits for purposes of
determining the shareholder taxability of the deemed distribution from the discount, which is not
practicable under existing law without triggering a corporate-level taxable gain, then the applicable
threshold would be the pre-distribution earnings and profits plus the amount of the E&P Bump.
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not be taxable at all at the corporate level. If the discount exceeds the
threshold amount by no more than the shareholders stock basis, that
excess will not be taxed at the time of the discount transaction. The
shareholder’s stock basis will be reduced pro tanto. Presumably,
therefore, a greater portion of some later stock disposition realization, or
a distribution treated as such,111 will be taxed at capital gains rates. The
current non-taxability will be offset, but only partially, by a deferred tax
at a lower rate.
If the discount exceeds the threshold amount by more than the
shareholders’ stock basis, a portion of that excess will be taxed
immediately as gain from the disposition of property. That excess will
be taxed at the time of the discount transaction with the corporation. In
addition, some increased portion of a later stock disposition realization,
or a distribution treated as such,112 will be taxable, generally at capital
gains rates. Thus, a portion of the deemed distribution will subject to
immediate partial taxation at less than full ordinary income tax rates, and
the balance will be subject to deferred taxation at the same rates.
In terms of the Laissez-Faire Approach, neither of these last two
possibilities is a fully satisfactory substitute for the ideal single level of
taxation. As such, collecting tax solely at the shareholder level is not an
appropriate resolution for the scenario of a discount in excess of the
corporation’s pre-distribution earnings and profits, because the scenario
assumes that the corporate-level tax is eliminated not deferred.
A potential resolution to this concern would be a minor amendment
of section 311(b), in place of its outright repeal. The amendment would
provide that a corporate distribution or discount sale of appreciated
property would trigger corporate-level gain only to the extent that the
amount deemed distributed is not treated as a dividend under section
301(c). That is the corporation would continue to recognize gain to the
extent that the discount exceeds the corporation’s current and
accumulated earnings and profits.113
Another potential issue is a concern about discount sales to
taxpayers that are not fully taxable. For a domestic non-taxable entity
the deemed dividend amount may not be taxable at all because it is not
included in unrelated business taxable income.114 One might regard the
non-taxability of dividends to non-profit entities as predicated on the full
111. Id. § 301(c)(3).
112. Id.
113. As previously noted, the analysis is predicated on the expiration of reduced tax rates on
qualified dividend distributions. See supra note 108.
114. I.R.C. §§ 511-515 (2006).
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taxability of corporate earnings. Likewise, for foreign taxpayers, one
might take the view that income tax treaty provisions providing tax
exemptions or rate reductions on dividends are predicated on the full
taxability of the distributing corporations.115 In either case, the
application of a tax solely at the shareholder level would, therefore, not
be considered an adequate solution.116 The obvious resolution would be
to continue to apply the CDD to impose a tax at the corporate level in
these limited circumstances. In terms of addressing this issue by
amending section 311(b), this would call for the continued application of
the current rule to the corporation if the shareholder is not fully taxable.
The alternative option, either for limited circumstances in which the
single shareholder tax is inadequate or for all of these discount property
transactions if the shareholder-level tax cannot be made adequate, is to
collect the tax solely at the corporate level, and not at the shareholder
level. This surrogate taxation at the corporate level is an adequate single
level of tax, subject to the caveats noted above in Part 4.1.1.117 The one
additional potential problem is that the recognition of the full discount as
corporate income normally results in an increase in corporate earnings
and profits.118 That increase would trigger a second tax when those
earnings are distributed to shareholders. The simple solution, of course,
is simply not to make the earnings and profits adjustment. To the extent
that it is feasible to set aside the CDD, in whole or in part, it surely must
be equally feasible to make this adjustment from current practice.
Neither is a perfect resolution for all situations. The Laissez-Faire
Approach can easily find a combination of the two that serves well the
Integrationist Norm. In the case of domestic non-profits and foreign
persons not fully taxable on dividends, the preferred solution appears to
be to collect the tax at the corporate level as a surrogate for the
normative individual tax. In other situations, there is a judgment that
must be made. One possibility is to collect the tax at the shareholder
level, collecting a corporate-level tax only with respect to the portion—if
any—of the distribution not fully taxable as a dividend.119 If the legal

115. See, e.g., Hugh J. Ault, Corporate Integration, Tax Treaties and the Division of the
International Tax Base, 47 TAX. L. REV. 565, 565-66, 567-69 (1992).
116. On the other hand, if the deemed dividend to a foreign person is subject to full U.S. net
basis taxation, I.R.C. §§ 871(b), 882, or to the full 30% gross basis tax on fixed or determinable
annual or periodical income, I.R.C. §§ 871(a), 881, the shareholder-level tax should be considered
the normative single level of tax and therefore the fully appropriate single level of tax.
117. See supra notes 35-50 and accompanying text.
118. See I.R.C. § 312(b) (2006).
119. As previously noted, the analysis is predicated on the expiration of reduced tax rates on
qualified dividend distributions. See supra note 108.
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change necessary to accomplish this is feasible, it will no doubt result in
over taxation in at least some circumstances. If this is not feasible, the
other possibility is to forgo the shareholder-level tax and collect the tax
solely at the corporate level. This may result in under taxation in at least
some circumstances.120 The Laissez-Faire Approach counsels selecting
one of these alternatives rather than continuing to generate deadweight
losses by consuming judicial, IRS, and taxpayer resources in an attempt
to impose two full levels of taxation.121
D.

Transactions Claiming Corporate-Level Deduction

In terms of the Integrationist Norm, perhaps the most
straightforward cases are those in which a corporate-level deduction is
paired with full taxability at the shareholder level. These transactions
might take the form of corporate payments to shareholders as interest or
as compensation for services or the use of property.122 Under existing
law and practice, the IRS polices these transactions to determine whether
a recharacterization is required. The obligation on which interest is paid
might be recharacterized as equity rather than debt. The compensation
for services might be considered unreasonably high. The result is the
denial of the corporate deduction and the recharacterization of the
shareholder income as a dividend.
Based on an Integrationist Norm, much of this enforcement effort is
a pure waste of resources. Corporate earnings should be subject to a
single level of taxation, not two levels of taxation. If the Integrationist
Norm is fiscal transparency, it is the shareholder-level tax rate schedule
that should apply. Therefore, so long as the shareholder is fully taxable
with respect to the same amount as the corporate deduction, allowing the
deduction at the corporate level is no worse than the treatment of fiscally
transparency. A principle of consistency should be sufficient to resolve
the issue. So long as the recipient is fully taxable with respect to the
amount the corporation deducts, the allowance of a deduction to the
corporation is unproblematic.123 Resources consumed—by the IRS,

120. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text (outlining the argument that a level of
under taxation is preferable to full double taxation under these circumstances).
121. There may be specific instances in which either the corporation or the shareholder is
judgment proof with respect to the tax. In that case, the IRS might be well counseled to attempt to
collect the single level of tax from the taxpayer from whom it can be collected.
122. See Bittker & Eustice, supra note 86, at ¶¶8.05[3], [5], [7].
123. If the recipient is not a shareholder, but the amount is paid to the recipient on behalf of the
shareholder, see Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716 (1929), Baumer v. United States,
580 F.2d 863, 882-83 (5th Cir. 1978), the Laissez-Faire Approach has no objection to assigning the
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taxpayers, and the judicial system—in the challenge of the deduction
serve a counterproductive end, and the challenge should be avoided.124
V. CONCLUSION
From the perspective of the Integrationist Norm, there are clearly
circumstances in which it is appropriate to dispense with the application
of the CDD. In as much as it serves to reinforce the anti-ideal of double
taxation, it is wasteful and counterproductive. If there are circumstances
in which it is to be retained, it must be because of a judgment that the
CDD serves to prevent other distortions in the tax system that are of
greater concern than the distortions of double taxation. There is a need
for a judgment to resolve this second best problem about which
reasonable minds can differ. This Article has presented and analyzed
critically multiple circumstances in which the CDD is currently applied
in order to identify circumstances in which it is wise to dispense with its
application, and it has identified several such circumstances in which the
Integrationist Norm counsels dispensing with the CDD.

income to the shareholder, see Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). This may be considered
important if the pertinent shareholder is in a higher tax bracket than is the actual recipient.
124. See Polito, supra note 9, at 51-62 (providing equivalent analysis for corporate deductions
for services compensation and interest). A potentially different case is presented if the tax treatment
of the payee depends on the characterization of what it is for which the payment is made. See, e.g.,
I.R.C. §§ 861-65 (2006) (providing differing rules for determining whether income is foreign or
domestic source depending upon the characterization of the transaction). In these cases it is
appropriate to continue to police for the correct characterization at the payee level.
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